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THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE GENUINE 
LINK 
Rayner Thwaites* 
The genuine link principle has become a standard-bearer for the view that citizenship is, or should 
be, substantive, in the sense that it is conditioned on the existence of certain "social facts". As such, 
it has become a source of inspiration in citizenship theory. It is seen to provide a benevolent 
framework for thinking about citizenship status. Against the tendency to treat "genuine link" as a 
guiding principle, I argue that it carries within it fundamental problems. These problems have been 
known for a long time. In particular, they were prefigured in dissents in the decision that introduced 
the principle, namely the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in Nottebohm, delivered in 
1955, in the initial academic legal commentary on that decision, and in the doctrine's subsequent 
legal reception. Drawing on these sources I argue that genuine link, as employed in Nottebohm, has 
in doctrinal terms been confined to a historical footnote. In a second strand of the argument, I develop 
the problems that attend using the genuine link as a beacon, both in theory and practice. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
The genuine link principle has become a standard-bearer for the view that citizenship is, or should 
be, substantive, in the sense that it is conditioned on the existence of certain "social facts".1 As such, 
it has become a source of inspiration in citizenship theory.2 It is seen to provide a benevolent 
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1  The genuine link principle is also commonly referred to as the "genuine connection" requirement. Where 
appropriate, I refer to the genuine link as a principle, a doctrine and a test. For the purpose of this article, the 
congruence between the concepts of nationality and citizenship is such that the terms are used 
interchangeably. 
2  In Part IV I analyse a prominent case study, the use made of the genuine link principle in Ayelet Shachar The 
Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2009) at 
ch 6. 
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framework for thinking about citizenship status. Against the tendency to treat "genuine link" as a 
guiding principle, I argue that it carries within it fundamental problems. These problems have been 
known for a long time. In particular, they were prefigured in dissents in the decision that introduced 
the principle, namely the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in Nottebohm,3 delivered in 
1955, in the initial academic legal commentary on that decision, and in the doctrine's subsequent legal 
reception. Drawing on these sources I argue that genuine link, as employed in Nottebohm, has in 
doctrinal terms been confined to a historical footnote.4 In a second strand of the argument, I develop 
the problems that attend using the genuine link as a beacon, both in theory and practice.5 
The genuine link principle was introduced in Nottebohm and is encapsulated in the following 
passage from the majority judgment:6 
… nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be 
said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either 
directly by the law or as a result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the 
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. 
To understand the nature of the principle and its implications we need context, and start by 
returning to the decision that introduced it. Nottebohm concerned the admissibility of a claim to 
diplomatic protection by Liechtenstein against Guatemala in respect of injuries to a Liechtenstein 
national, Mr Friedrich Nottebohm. To adopt the International Law Commission's definition, contained 
in Article 1 of its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection:7 
  
3  Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Rep 4. 
4  I arrive at the same conclusion as Audrey Macklin in "Is it Time to Retire Nottebohm?" (2017) 111 AJIL 
Unbound 492. 
5  In its scope, this article is confined to the genuine link requirement as it relates to natural human persons and 
references to persons or individuals are to be understood accordingly. The influence of the genuine link 
requirement has radiated outward: Case No A/18 (Iran v United States) (1984) 75 ILR 175 at 192. For 
introductions to its usage with respect to flag ships and corporations see respectively Doris König Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009, online ed) Flag of Ships; and Manuel Casas "Nationalities 
of Convenience, Personal Jurisdiction, and Access to Investor-State Dispute Settlement" (2016) 49 NYU J 
Intl Law & Pol 63.  
6  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 23. 
7  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-eighth session [2006] vol 2, pt 2 YILC 1 
[ILC 2006 Report, Yearbook] at [49], "Text of the draft articles on diplomatic protection", art 1. In Ahmadou 
Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Preliminary Objections) [2007] ICJ 
Rep 582 at 599 the International Court of Justice confirmed that the definition in art 1 of the Draft Articles 
reflects international customary law. 
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… diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement by 
a State adopting in its own right the cause of its national in respect of an injury to that national arising 
from an internationally wrongful act of another State … 
Diplomatic protection is a means by which a state can bring a claim at international law on behalf 
of one of its nationals. In Nottebohm it was agreed between the parties and noted by the Court at the 
outset of its reasoning that "it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual which 
alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection".8 Nottebohm was born a German 
citizen in 1881. He acquired Liechtenstein citizenship in 1939, losing his German citizenship in the 
process. He was a long-time resident, but not a citizen, of Guatemala, taking up residence there in 
1905. The substantive claim pursued through diplomatic protection was compensation from 
Guatemala for actions that took place in 1943 and following, his "unjustified detention, internment, 
expulsion, and subsequent exclusion, from Guatemala … and by the sequestration and confiscation 
of his property".9 
The majority held that to be eligible to bring a claim for diplomatic protection on Nottebohm's 
behalf, Liechtenstein needed to establish: (a) that Nottebohm was a national of Liechtenstein under 
its law; and (b) that he had a genuine connection with Liechtenstein.10 Guatemala's objection to the 
admissibility of Liechtenstein's claim succeeded at the second step. The majority found that 
Nottebohm did not have a "genuine connection" with Liechtenstein at the time of naturalisation,11 and 
accordingly that Liechtenstein's claim to diplomatic protection on his behalf was inadmissible at 
international law. In addition to the majority judgment there were three dissents, all of which dissented 
both as to the existence of the "genuine link" concept in law and as to the result.12 The reasoning and 
commentary of Judge Read's dissent is of particular importance to my argument.13 
  
8  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 13, quoting from Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v Lithuania) (Judgment) 
(1939) PCIJ (series A/B) No 76 at 16. 
9  Mervyn Jones "The Nottebohm Case" (1956) 5 ICLQ 230 at 231. The relevant passage from Liechtenstein's 
memorial is quoted in Nottebohm, above n 3, at 6–7. 
10  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 23. See also HF van Panhuys The Role of Nationality in International Law: An 
Outline (AW Sijthoff, Leiden, 1959) at 97.  
11  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 24–26. There has been a long-running debate, beginning with a difference between 
the majority and dissents in Nottebohm, as to the correctness of the majority's decision to treat the time of 
naturalisation as the "critical date" on which Nottebohm's "genuine link" with Liechtenstein fell to be 
established. For a sustained discussion of this issue see LFE Goldie "The Critical Date" (1963) 12 ICLQ 1251 
at 1268–1273. 
12  Compare Robert Sloane "Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of 
Nationality" (2009) 50 Harv Intl LJ 1 at 4 and generally 11–24. Sloane argues that the genuine connection 
test was dicta and that the basis of the Court's decision was a tacit application of the doctrine of abuse of right. 
13  The other dissents were Judge Klaestad and Judge Guggenheim (ad hoc). 
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In terms of the basis of nationality law and the relationship between international and domestic 
law in this area, Nottebohm itself is regularly cited as authority for the proposition that:14  
… it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its 
nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with 
that legislation.  
While it is for each state to determine the grant of its own nationality, this is not to say that a state's 
determination is to be accepted internationally without question. Article 1 of the Convention on 
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930 states:15 
It is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other 
States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles 
of law generally recognised with regard to nationality. 
Article 1 is generally treated as a statement of customary international law and appears to have 
been so treated by the majority in Nottebohm.16  
In Nottebohm, the majority went out of its way to stress that it was not impugning the validity of 
Liechtenstein's grant of citizenship to Nottebohm as a matter of domestic law.17 It was only denying 
recognition to that grant of citizenship as a matter of international law, insofar as that citizenship was 
being used to ground a claim for diplomatic protection as against Guatemala.18 A consistent set of 
criticisms of "genuine link", first voiced in the dissents in Nottebohm, attaches to the majority's 
position that non-recognition for the purpose of diplomatic protection would leave his citizenship 
otherwise unaffected.19 This set of criticisms objects that it is incoherent to refuse recognition to 
Nottebohm's citizenship with respect to one core attribute of citizenship (diplomatic protection) while 
leaving untouched, for example, Liechtenstein's obligation to accept him as a national if deported 
there.  
In Part II, the discussion of the "genuine link" is anchored in the circumstances of Nottebohm and 
the majority reasoning that gave us the principle. The initial legal response to the reasoning in 
  
14  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 20, quoted, for example, by the High Court of Australia in Re Canavan [2017] HCA 
45, (2017) 91 ALJR 1209 at [38]. See also Sykes v Cleary [1992] HCA 60, (1992) 176 CLR 77 at 106 per 
Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ. 
15  Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 179 LNTS 89 (adopted 12 April 
1930, entered into force 1 July 1937), art 1. 
16  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 23.  
17  At 20–21. 
18  At 17 and 20–21. 
19  See for example Nottebohm, above n 3, at 46–48 per Judge Read dissenting; Josef L Kunz "The Nottebohm 
Judgement (Second Phase)" (1960) 54 AJIL 536 at 547–548; and Macklin, above n 4, at 495–496. 
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Nottebohm, and particularly the genuine link principle, was broadly critical, with academic 
commentary more inclined to side with, develop and supplement the criticisms contained in the 
dissents. This critical response was not confined to scholarship. It also characterised the reception of 
the genuine link doctrine in subsequent legal decisions and fora as outlined in Part III. One concern 
was that the genuine link doctrine, with its attendant problems, would burst the bounds of diplomatic 
protection and be applied as a principle of nationality more generally. This prospect has eventuated 
within citizenship theory, as developed in the illustrative case study of a related principle proposed 
by Shachar, analysed in Part IV. The use made of the genuine link principle in citizenship theory 
forgets the principle's earlier critical reception. In what follows I draw on that earlier critical reception 
to illustrate the principle's problems. 
To better understand the principle, I return to the circumstances of its origin and identify what 
was distinctive and new with respect to the genuine link in Nottebohm. 
II REVISITING NOTTEBOHM  
A  The Circumstances of the Case 
Mr Friedrich Nottebohm was born in Hamburg, Germany in 1881, acquiring German citizenship 
at birth. He retained that German citizenship until his acquisition of the citizenship of Liechtenstein. 
He took up residence in Guatemala in 1905 and continued to have his fixed abode there until 1943. 
He was partner in, and later head of, the firm Nottebohm Hermanos, which by the 1930s was the 
second largest coffee producer in Guatemala.20 
The injuries to Nottebohm that formed the substance of the claim were actions of the Guatemalan 
government but were largely instigated by the United States, as outlined below. Other aspects of the 
United States' involvement related to the fact that Nottebohm and his family had assets in the United 
States. The key events on which the case turned occurred in and around the Second World War, but 
some of the tensions and issues which emerged at that time were prefigured in the First World War. 
In that earlier conflict, the Nottebohm family and business interests came under suspicion for their 
ties to Germany.21 The United States government declared Nottebohm Hermanos to be an enemy 
alien under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and seized its property in the United States.22 
Following the War the family was able to satisfy United States authorities that the company was not 
an enemy or ally of an enemy within the meaning of the TWEA and the property was released.23 
  
20  Cindy G Buys "Nottebohm's Nightmare: Have We Exorcised the Ghosts of WWII Detention Programs or Do 
They Still Haunt Guantanamo?" (2011) 11 Chicago-Kent JICL 1 at 3. 
21  Buys, above n 20, at 3. The actions of the United States government in World War I are referred to by Judge 
Read in his dissent in Nottebohm, above n 3, at 49. 
22  Trading with the Enemy Act 50 USC § 5(b).  
23  Buys, above n 20, at 3–4. 
650 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
In March 1939, on the eve of the outbreak of World War II, Nottebohm travelled from Guatemala 
to Europe, visiting Hamburg as well as Vaduz in Liechtenstein, where one of his brothers lived. In 
October that year, a month after the outbreak of World War II, marked by Germany's attack on 
Poland,24 Nottebohm applied for naturalisation as a citizen of Liechtenstein. He requested, and 
received, dispensation under Liechtenstein nationality law from the standard naturalisation 
requirement of three years residence, undertaking various financial payments to the Liechtenstein 
authorities.25 He was naturalised as a national of Liechtenstein that year. On acquiring Liechtenstein 
nationality he lost his German nationality by operation of the relevant provision of the German 
Nationality Law of 1913. On becoming a national of Liechtenstein that became his sole nationality. 
Nottebohm obtained a visa for Guatemala using his new Liechtenstein passport and used that 
passport to return to Guatemala in January 1940.26 Guatemala officially entered the war against 
Germany on 11 December 1941.27 In October 1943, Nottebohm was summoned by the Guatemalan 
authorities to be deported to and detained in the United States on the basis that he was an enemy alien. 
He protested that he was no longer a German citizen, showing police his Liechtenstein passport. The 
Swiss embassy, acting on behalf of Liechtenstein, protested his deportation to and detention in the 
United States, but to no effect.28  
Friedrich Nottebohm was detained in camps in Texas and then North Dakota together with his 
nephews Kurt and Karl-Heinz.29 Friedrich Nottebohm's treatment in the Second World War formed 
  
24  In discussions of Nottebohm, the wartime context has been raised as going to motivation, see in the text 
accompanying n 40 below. It was also seen, in a more doctrinal vein, as raising legal issues going to enemy 
alien status: see for example Goldie, above n 11, at 1271–1272. 
25  For this reason, Nottebohm is often characterised as a case involving the sale of citizenship: see for example 
Ayelet Shachar "Citizenship for Sale?" in Ayelet Shachar and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Citizenship (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) 789 at 812. As a normative matter, there is considerable 
debate as to what should follow from this characterisation: see for example Helen Irving "Citizenship for Sale: 
What's the Objection?" (Legal Studies Research Paper No 18/05, University of Sydney, 2018). 
26  On the legal consequences of Guatemala's acceptance of his Liechtenstein passport see Nottebohm, above n 
3, at 46–48 per Judge Read dissenting. This passage from Judge Read has featured in parliamentary debate 
over the United Kingdom's current practice of stripping a British national of his or her citizenship while he or 
she is travelling on a British passport overseas. For the start of the exchange conducted through Parliament 
see Guy Goodwin-Gill "Mr Al-Jedda, Deprivation of Citizenship and International Law" (revised draft of a 
paper presented to a seminar at Middlesex University, 14 February 2014). Referenced and quoted in United 
Kingdom Joint Committee on Human Rights Legislative Scrutiny: Immigration Bill (second Report) – Twelfth 
Report of Session 2013–14 (3 March 2014). 
27  Some of the debate over Nottebohm has centred on how the law on enemy aliens applied to the facts: see 
above n 24. 
28  Buys, above n 20, at 8–9. 
29  At 4–5. On Kurt Nottebohm see Stephen Fox America's Invisible Gulag: A Biography of German American 
Internment & Exclusion in World War II: Memory and History (Peter Lang, New York, 2000) at 105. 
Friedrich's nephews were both born in Guatemala and had become Guatemalan citizens. This raises a 
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part of a "United States-Latin American detention" programme, involving over 4,000 such 
deportees.30 The United States pressured Latin American countries to identify and turn over to the 
United States persons of German nationality or ancestry. While the programme originated in national 
security concerns, assuming those of German background to be Nazi sympathisers, it was maintained 
even for those subsequently deemed to present little or no security risk, such as the Nottebohms, on 
the grounds that it benefitted United States economic influence in Latin America.31 
Nottebohm was released from Fort Lincoln, North Dakota on 22 January 1946, in midwinter. To 
quote from Buys:32 
The [United States] government concluded that it had no credible evidence of Nazi sympathies or activities 
by Fredrich Nottebohm. A December 1945 Memorandum from the US Embassy in Guatemala states that 
"Nottebohm's name does not appear on the Nazi party list believed to be authentic, and there is no reliable 
evidence to indicate that he was a member of the party or even a sympathizer of Hitler." 
While Friedrich Nottebohm was in detention, a series of 57 legal proceedings were commenced 
against him in Guatemala, "designed to expropriate, without compensation to him, all of his 
properties".33  
On release from detention in the United States, Nottebohm travelled to New Orleans and applied 
for permission to return to Guatemala. Permission was refused and he "was thus prevented from 
assuming the personal direction of the complex network of litigation".34 In summary, as addressed in 
Judge Read's dissent, Nottebohm was "arrested, forcibly removed to the United States, interned for 
over two years, and stripped of his Guatemalan property … without due process of law".35 
Nottebohm travelled to Liechtenstein instead. Liechtenstein brought a claim for diplomatic 
protection to the International Court of Justice, arguing that the Guatemalan government's treatment 
of the person and property of Nottebohm was contrary to international law in the following respects:36 
  
secondary issue, for another article, of the treatment Friedrich Nottebohm would have received if he was a 
Guatemalan citizen and the implications of the answer to that question. 
30  Max Paul Friedman Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin 
America in World War II (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 2. 
31  Friedman, above n 30, at 168. 
32  Buys, above n 20, at 11–12. 
33  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 34 per Judge Read dissenting. 
34  At 34 per Judge Read dissenting. 
35  Buys, above n 20, at 15. See also Nottebohm, above n 3, at 34–35 per Judge Read dissenting. 
36  Jones, above n 9, at 231; and Nottebohm, above n 3, at 6–7. 
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(1) by the unjustified detention, internment, expulsion and subsequent exclusion, from 
Guatemala, of Nottebohm, and by the sequestration and confiscation of his property; and 
(2) by its failure to pay full compensation for the unlawful acts complained of. 
Guatemala responded in its final submissions by challenging the admissibility of Liechtenstein's 
claim for diplomatic protection on the bases that Nottebohm had not acquired Liechtenstein 
nationality as a matter of domestic law; that, in the alternative, his naturalisation was contrary to 
"generally recognized principles" of international law; and that his nationality had been solicited 
fraudulently, to evade the consequences of enemy alien status, without any "genuine intention to 
establishing a durable link" with Liechtenstein.37 The decision with which we are concerned,38 that 
of the International Court of Justice delivered on 6 April 1955, was a preliminary decision on the 
admissibility of Liechtenstein's claim for diplomatic protection, framed by the majority in terms of 
the admissibility of Liechtenstein's claim at international law "as against Guatemala".  
The motivations imputed to Nottebohm in applying for Liechtenstein citizenship are seen to have 
influenced the majority's decision. These questions of motivation go to the Court's attitude and 
disposition with regards to the claim, as distinct from the legal relevance expressly assigned to 
motivation. Weis helpfully summarises factors thought likely to have coloured the majority's decision, 
including:39  
Professor Henri Rolin's allusions, in his eloquent pleadings as counsel for Guatemala, that Nottebohm had 
bought his naturalization; that he had been a member of the Nazi party, and the emphasis on his close 
business connections with Germany.  
Weis also emphasises views in wide circulation as to the ease with which German nationality 
could be resumed,40 supporting a narrative whereby Nottebohm was temporarily relinquishing his 
German nationality to avoid the consequences of enemy alien status for his commercial interests.   
An alternative set of motivations was readily available to the Court at the time of judgment, as 
most publicly evidenced by the dissents, the most sustained of which is that offered by Judge Read. 
Judge Read suggests that, rather than concerns about anticipated Guatemalan belligerency, the more 
likely motivation for Nottebohm's naturalisation was to protect Nottebohm Hermanos' assets in the 
  
37  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 11. 
38  This article addresses the 1955 Nottebohm decision of the International Court of Justice, as distinct from an 
earlier decision in the litigation, Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) [1953] ICJ Rep 111. 
39  Paul Weis Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (2nd ed, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, The Netherlands, 
1979) at 179–180.  
40  At 179, and see 79–80. This influence is evident on the face of the majority judgment: see for example 
Nottebohm, above n 3, at 26.  
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United States.41 This concern had its source in the United States' conduct in World War I,42 mentioned 
above. 
Diplomatic protection was the sole remaining means by which Nottebohm could bring a legal 
proceeding with respect to the actions of the Guatemalan government regarding his internment, 
deportation and confiscation of property. If he could not bring a claim for diplomatic protection by 
way of his citizenship of Liechtenstein, he was effectively stateless for the purpose of diplomatic 
protection.43 The dissents and early critics were inclined to view diplomatic protection as a procedural 
mechanism whereby an individual could access international justice.44 By way of contrast, the 
majority judgment was seen to favour state interests by imposing "yet a further limitation upon the 
availability of international justice to the individual as such".45 
B  Nottebohm's Distinctive Contribution: a "Restrictive Innovation" 
In this section, I outline both what distinguished the doctrine introduced in Nottebohm from its 
precursors and how its precursors informed its content. The requirement of "genuine link" introduced 
in Nottebohm was a "restrictive innovation" in the field of international claims.46 More particularly, 
what was new was the application of the "genuine connection" requirement to a person with only one 
nationality.47 The precedents the Court gave for the genuine connection test were taken from 
  
41  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 48–49 per Judge Read dissenting. In addition to the influence of the United States 
government on the Guatemalan authorities in World War II, described above, the United States government 
seized the assets of Nottebohm Hermanos in the United States: Buys, above n 20, at 7–8. See also the later 
history on the terms of the United States government's settlement with the Nottebohms: Buys, above n 20, at 
12–13. 
42  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 49 per Judge Read dissenting. Judge Read had had earlier exposure to wartime 
expropriation. As legal advisor to the Canadian Department of External Affairs in 1942 he was a forceful, if 
ultimately unsuccessful, internal critic of the Canadian government's confiscation of the property of Japanese 
Canadians: see Eric Adams and Jordan Stanger-Ross "Promises of Law: The Unlawful Dispossession of 
Japanese Canadians" (2017) 54 Osgoode Hall LJ 687. 
43  Hans Goldschmidt "Recent Applications of Domestic Nationality Laws by International Tribunals" (1959) 28 
Fordham L Rev 689 at 697–698; and Kunz, above n 19, at 543. 
44  See for example Jones, above n 9, at 244. 
45  Jones, above n 9, at 244. The distinction is now sometimes expressed as one between a "statist" and individual 
rights orientation, with the majority in Nottebohm favouring the former and the reasoning of the dissents 
favouring the latter: see for example Mads Andenas "Reassertion and Transformation: From Fragmentation 
to Convergence in International Law" (2015) 46 GJIL 685 at 709–711. In the dissents and early criticism of 
the decision, the emphasis was on a denial of justice as opposed to a denial of individual rights.  
46  Jones, above n 9, at 239.  
47  Weis, above n 39, at 180. For a defence of the legal reasoning of the Nottebohm majority, including against 
the charge of "novelty" with respect to the genuine link, see James R Crawford Brownlie's Principles of Public 
International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 514–517.  
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arbitrations addressed to issues of plural nationality. More particularly, the precedents concerned the 
doctrine of "effective nationality".48 To understand the innovation constituted by the "genuine link" 
requirement, one needs to appreciate the doctrinal changes wrought by transplanting the "effective 
nationality" requirement from the plural nationality context to the circumstances of an individual with 
but one nationality.  
The field of operation for the "effective nationality" doctrine was where a national of State A sued 
State B in circumstances where he or she was also a national of State B. The doctrine of effective 
nationality is to be understood in its relation to a competing doctrine, the "doctrine of equality". The 
doctrine of equality held that where an individual had more than one nationality, these nationalities 
possessed equal weight and none of the states of nationality could bring a claim against the others.49 
Under the doctrine of equality, a person of plural nationality was precluded from bringing a claim 
against a state of which he or she was a national. The effective nationality doctrine was a way out of 
the impasse generated by the doctrine of equality. It held that a state could bring a claim on behalf of 
a national, as against another state of which he or she was also a national, provided that the claimant 
state was the state of the person's "real and effective" nationality, meaning the state to which he or she 
had the stronger factual ties. This was usually the state of domicile.50 In its original context, and 
understood in relation to the competing doctrine of equality, "effective nationality" was a means of 
enabling a person to bring a claim. 
In the plural nationality context, the doctrine of effective nationality allows an assessment of the 
relative strength of a person's ties, as between his or her countries of nationality. It is a way of 
managing issues generated by a person's plural nationality, so as to enable a claim that would 
otherwise be precluded.51 The need to assess the relative weight of a person's nationalities is a function 
of ascribing some weight to both. 
In its novel application to Nottebohm, a national of Liechtenstein and nowhere else, the test of 
"real and effective" nationality ceased to play a role in enabling an individual to make a claim that 
would otherwise be precluded. It had the opposite effect, serving as a new hurdle to the making of a 
claim, additional to nationality. The genuine connection requirement introduced in Nottebohm 
qualified a sole national's ability to exercise a core attribute of his or her nationality status, namely 
diplomatic protection. It did so on the basis of an assessment of the "genuineness" of his or her ties to 
the relevant country.  
  
48  Also sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "real and effective nationality".  
49  See van Panhuys, above n 10, at 74. See also the commentary of the ILC 2006 Report, Yearbook, above n 7, 
at [50], commentary to art 7, (2). 
50  van Panhuys, above n 10, at 74. 
51  Peter Spiro At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizenship (New York University Press, 
New York, 2016) at 64. 
 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE GENUINE LINK 655 
In Nottebohm, a doctrine that had been a means of managing the interaction between two states 
of nationality changed into something else. It became a doctrine that conditioned a person's ability to 
exercise his or her only nationality. The exercise of diplomatic protection, grounded in a person's 
nationality, was now conditioned on an assessment of "social facts" disclosing the presence or absence 
of a genuine link with the relevant state, absent any need to accommodate or balance the interaction 
of two nationalities held by a person. 
The provenance of the genuine connection test shaped its content and nature. In the Court's 
judgment in Nottebohm, the factors relevant to genuine connection are elaborated by reference back 
to the "real and effective nationality" doctrine espoused in the dual nationality context. The Nottebohm 
majority listed the factors relevant to a finding of "real and effective nationality", and by implication 
the "genuine link", as follows:52 
… the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors 
such as the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him 
for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc. 
The influence of principles from private international law on the real and effective nationality 
doctrine is reflected in the primacy accorded to habitual residence. The problem for which the 
effective nationality doctrine was the solution was how to prioritise between two states of nationality. 
Concepts from private international law, directed at resolving choice of law issues where an individual 
was a national of both states under their respective nationality laws, were apt to address this problem.  
In the content given to it, the genuine connection test bears the stamp of the private international 
law concepts that informed the doctrine of real and effective nationality. There is the same concern to 
locate the state with which one is most closely connected.53 It is a concept that is inimical to plural 
nationality.  
III  GENUINE LINK IN THE CONTEXT OF DIPLOMATIC 
PROTECTION  
A  Genuine Link in its Application to Sole Nationals  
In Part III I argue that the distinctive doctrine introduced in Nottebohm is a dead letter. This 
position is complicated by the fact that Nottebohm's authority is still called on in support of a different, 
less problematic, doctrine applicable to plural nationals. I outline where Nottebohm's authority has 
petered out and conversely the channels into which it has flowed in the area of diplomatic protection. 
  
52  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 22. 
53  See the key passage on the genuine link, quoted in text accompanying n 6 above. 
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Flegenheimer was a decision of the Italian–United States Conciliation Commission, set up under 
the Peace Treaty with Italy following the Second World War.54 The United States brought a claim 
against Italy under the Treaty on Mr Flegenheimer's behalf on the basis that he was a United States 
citizen, with respect to a forced sale at undervalue in 1941.55 The Italian government opposed the 
claim on the basis that Flegenheimer did not hold one of the nationalities required to bring a claim 
under the Treaty, more particularly that he did not possess United States nationality. The Italian 
government was successful in this argument. 
The Italian government had also advanced an alternative argument, "the theory of effective 
nationality", according to which, even if Flegenheimer was solely an American national, this 
nationality had no effect under the Treaty. Italy argued that:56 
… a nationality is not effective when it confines itself to establishing a nominal link between a State and 
an individual, and is not supported by a social solidity resulting from a veritable solidarity of rights and 
duties between the State and its national. 
In making this argument the Italian government sought to rely on Nottebohm.57 The Commission 
did not have to address this alternative argument to determine the matter before it. It had already 
decided against Flegenheimer on the basis that he was not an American national. Nonetheless, the 
Commission considered the "effective nationality" argument "[i]n the interest of an exhaustive 
analysis of Albert Flegenheimer's position vis-à-vis the United States".58 In its response to the 
"effective nationality" argument, the Commission stated that "it was doubtful" that Nottebohm 
established a rule of general international law in its use of the genuine link requirement.59  
International law texts commonly cite Flegenheimer as the leading authority for the proposition 
that Nottebohm's genuine connection test should be confined to the facts of the case.60 Understood as 
  
54  Flegenheimer Claim (Italian–United States Conciliation Commission) (1958) 25 ILR 91; and Treaty of Peace 
with Italy 49 UNTS 126 (signed 10 February 1947, entered into force 15 September 1947). 
55  The Italian Commission "operated on the basis of diplomatic protection, with states having control of the 
claim": see Kate Parlett The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) at 97. 
56  Flegenheimer, above n 54, at 147. 
57  At 147. 
58  At 146. 
59  At 148. "It is perhaps not irrelevant to remark that the third Member of the Commission, Professor Sauser-
Hall of Geneva and Neuchatel University, had been counsel for Liechtenstein in the Nottebohm case": Weis, 
above n 39, at 184. 
60  See for example Crawford, above n 47, at 40, n 132; Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 814; and Ivan Shearer and Brian Opeskin "Nationality and 
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a restrictive innovation applicable to sole nationals, Nottebohm has proved to be a ticket good for only 
one ride. 
In addition to diminishing the legal authority of the genuine link doctrine in its original field of 
operation (as a condition, additional to nationality, on a natural human person's exercise of diplomatic 
protection) Flegenheimer has, in a related move, served as a common reference point for substantive 
criticisms of genuine link. It is returned to in that connection in Part III(D) below. 
B  The Genuine Link in the Context of Plural Nationality 
One of the difficulties one faces in understanding Nottebohm's legacy is that the genuine link 
requirement has simultaneously proved a dead letter in the context in which the Court applied it (as a 
restrictive condition on a sole national's ability to bring a diplomatic protection claim) and gained a 
new lease of life in a different context, that of plural nationality. It did so as an authority for a doctrine 
which preceded Nottebohm and from which the genuine link requirement was adapted, namely the 
doctrine of "real and effective nationality". It will be recalled that this doctrine addressed the situation 
where a person was a national of both the claimant state and the state claimed against. It allowed a 
claim where the claimant state was, in relative terms, his or her "real and effective nationality". 
This repurposed use of Nottebohm has led some to assume that Nottebohm was a case involving 
a dual national.61 Even where scholars are well aware that Nottebohm had only Liechtenstein 
nationality, the case is nonetheless invoked in the plural nationality context on the grounds that 
"substantial links in questions of nationality and the exercise of protection" remain relevant in the 
context of plural nationality.62 The critical point is that when used in the context of plural nationality, 
the use made of the "genuine link" concept differs in key ways from its use in Nottebohm. It no longer 
serves as a general condition or qualification on a person's nationality, but rather as a means of 
managing the relationship between the different nationalities held by a person. 
The decision treated as initiating this repurposed use of the "genuine link" requirement in the 
plural nationality context is Mergé, another decision of the Italian–United States Conciliation 
Commission (along with Flegenheimer), delivered in 1955, only a few months after Nottebohm.63 
Mrs Mergé was a dual Italian–American national. The Commission held that the United States could 
  
Statelessness" in Brian Opeskin and others Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 93 at 97–98.  
61  See Dixon, McCorqoudale and Williams who refer to the "circumstances of the case" in Nottebohm as 
including "where the person was a dual national": see Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale and Sarah 
Williams Cases & Materials on International Law (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) at 436. 
62  Weis, above n 39, at 176, and see more generally 176–181. See also Spiro, above n 51, at 61–63. 
63  Mergé Claim (Italian-United States Conciliation Commission) (1955) 22 ILR 443. See Weis, above n 39, at 
176, and see more generally 176–181. See also Spiro, above 51, at 61–63; and ILC 2006 Report, Yearbook, 
above n 7, at 34–35. 
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not present a claim against Italy on Mrs Mergé's behalf under the Treaty, notwithstanding her 
undisputed American nationality. The Commission held that, because Mrs Mergé's family did not 
have its habitual residence in the United States and the "permanent professional life" of the head of 
the family was elsewhere, she could not be considered "to be dominantly a United States national".64 
The Commission set up the tension between the doctrine of equality and the doctrine of effective 
nationality. The Commission treated Nottebohm as resolving the tension between these two doctrines: 
where the claiming state was the person's predominant state of nationality, the doctrine of equality 
should yield to the doctrine of effective nationality and the claim be allowed.65 Where it was not 
proved that the claiming state was the predominant state of nationality, the doctrine of equality held, 
barring the claim.66 
The above reasoning makes a relative assessment of an individual's strength of connection as 
between the claimant state and the state claimed against, where the claim is in respect of an individual 
who is a national of both. In the course of its reasoning, the Commission addressed another scenario. 
It stated that where a United States citizen possessed the nationality of a third state (ie, other than 
Italy), this had no bearing on their ability to bring a claim.67 Even if the person's predominant 
nationality was of this third state, this had no effect on his or her ability to bring a claim as a United 
States' national under the Treaty. This observation underscores the fact that the role assigned to 
"genuine link" in Mergé was to manage the interaction between nationalities held by a plural national, 
and not to otherwise qualify a person's nationality or its protections. 
This last scenario, where it is argued that because a person's "predominant" nationality was that 
of a third state they could not rely on another nationality they held as the basis for a claim, has also 
been rejected in European Union (EU) law. An excursion into EU law is warranted as the relevant 
legal materials provide a prominent and expressive characterisation of the genuine link requirement 
as anachronistic. At the centre of the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Micheletti is 
the value of possession of citizenship status, shorn of any additional requirement of "genuine link".68 
Mr Micheletti was a national of both Italy (an EU member state) and Argentina. He was born in 
Argentina and travelled from there to Spain. He applied, on the basis of his Italian nationality, for a 
permanent European Community resident's card in Spain in order to practise as a dentist there. Spain 
denied his application, its rationale being that it was not Italy that was Mr Micheletti's country of 
  
64  Mergé, above n 63, at 456–457. 
65  In this article, "dominant" and "predominant" are used interchangeably in the context of the effective 
nationality doctrine, though see in the text accompanying n 81 below. 
66  Mergé, above n 63, at 455. 
67  At 456. 
68  Case C-369/90 Mario Vicente Micheletti v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239. 
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"effective nationality", but Argentina. The ECJ rejected this attempt to condition the exercise of his 
Italian nationality on additional connecting factors. In doing so, it expressly rejected the adoption of 
Nottebohm's genuine link requirement as a matter of EU law. 
The Spanish authorities denied Mr Micheletti's application on the basis of a provision of the 
Spanish civil code held to provide that in the case of dual nationals, where neither nationality was 
Spanish, the nationality of a person's prior place of habitual residence (here Argentina) was 
determinative. The question for the ECJ was:69 
… may the Kingdom of Spain disregard the status as a Community national of the person concerned, 
which derives from his Italian nationality, simply because he possesses Argentinian nationality and 
Argentina was previously his country of habitual residence?  
The Spanish referring court cited the principle of "effective nationality" from Nottebohm in 
support of the position of the Spanish authorities, arguing that acceptance of Nottebohm should 
remove any objection to statutory reliance on "another, subsidiary connecting factor, such as that of 
habitual residence".70 Nottebohm was treated as sanctioning the imposition of additional conditions 
on recognition of a person's nationality, and habitual residence was treated as a component of the 
genuine connection test. 
Responding to the Nottebohm argument, in his presentation of the case the Advocate General 
stated:71 
I do not believe that the case before the Court constitutes an appropriate setting in which to raise the 
problems relating to effective nationality, whose origins lie in the "romantic period" of international 
relations and, in particular, in the concept of diplomatic protection; still less, in my view, is the well known 
(and, it is worth remembering, controversial) Nottebohm judgment of the International Court of Justice of 
any relevance. Nor, above all, is it necessary, in my opinion, to view the problem in terms of a choice of 
the applicable law from the standpoint of private international law. 
The fact is that Article 52 of the Treaty … merely requires that at least one of those nationalities, 
possession of which is not open to question, should be that of a Member State. 
The submissions of the Advocate General were followed by the ECJ.72 The approach of the ECJ 
to EU citizenship in Micheletti parallels the approach of the Nottebohm dissents to nationality. The 
available protections of EU citizenship or public international law are held to hinge on the possession 
  
69  At I-4241–4242. 
70  At I-4242. Spain's unsuccessful attempt to employ "effective nationality" here mirrors Italy's unsuccessful 
invocation of the doctrine in Flegenheimer, above n 54, as discussed in Part III(A). 
71  At I-4255 per Advocate General Tesauro. 
72  At I-4263. 
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of the relevant nationality. They are not contingent on satisfying any further requirement, whether 
derived from public or private international law, that a national be a habitual resident. Such additional 
requirements are dismissed as an anachronism and consigned to the "'romantic period' of international 
relations".73  
C  The International Law Commission's Draft Articles 
These two strands of Nottebohm's legacy, a short strand, cut off by Flegenheimer in 1958 with 
respect to individuals with a sole nationality, and a much longer strand, beginning with Mergé, 
managing the interaction between states where a person is a national of both, come together in the 
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (Draft Articles).74 The status 
of the Draft Articles is not settled. They have been held to represent customary international law in 
certain respects,75 and more generally to have made a substantial contribution to the law of diplomatic 
protection.76 
Draft Article 4 states:77 
For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a natural person, a State of nationality means a State 
whose nationality that person has acquired, in accordance with the law of that State, by birth, descent, 
naturalization, succession of States or in any other manner, not inconsistent with international law. 
In its commentary, the International Law Commission (ILC) states:78 
Draft article 4 does not require a State to prove an effective or genuine link between itself and its national, 
along the lines suggested in the Nottebohm case, as an additional factor for the exercise of diplomatic 
protection … 
The Commission here cited Flegenheimer for the proposition that Nottebohm was limited to the 
facts of the case in question.79  
  
73  At I-4255. 
74  ILC 2006 Report, Yearbook, above n 7, at [49]. 
75  Diallo (Preliminary Objections), above n 7, at 599. 
76  See the discussion of the Draft Articles in United Nations General Assembly "Sixth Committee (Legal) – 68th 
session: Diplomatic Protection (Agenda item 82)" General Assembly of the United Nations 
<www.un.org/en/ga/>. 
77  ILC 2006 Report, Yearbook, above n 7, at [49], art 4. 
78  At [50], commentary to art 4, (5).  
79  At [50], commentary to art 4, (5).  
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The ILC also endorsed the Mergé line of authority. Draft Article 7 states in part:80 
A State of nationality may not exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person against a State of 
which that person is also a national unless the nationality of the former State is predominant …  
The ILC sourced the term "predominant" in the Mergé claim, and favoured it over the terms 
"effective" or "dominant" as it "conveys the elements of relativity and indicates that the individual 
has stronger ties with one State rather than another".81 In outlining the jurisprudence on the "effective 
nationality" doctrine, the ILC notes that Nottebohm relied on, and so supported, this doctrine, which 
was then given "explicit approval" in Mergé.82 
In summary, within public international law and with respect to natural human persons, the 
"restrictive innovation" of Nottebohm has proved to be a "one-off".83 The genuine connection test as 
formulated and applied in Nottebohm, namely as a condition for the recognition of a sole national's 
nationality status for the purposes of diplomatic protection, can be confined to the facts of the case. 
In a distinct application, Nottebohm has given impetus to the "real and effective nationality" doctrine 
that preceded that decision. As outlined above,84 the doctrine of real and effective nationality, 
operating in the context of plural nationality, diverges from the "genuine connection" test in its intent 
and effects. 
To this point in Part III, I have addressed the nature and extent of continuing legal authority for 
the genuine link principle introduced in Nottebohm. I now turn to substantive lines of criticism of the 
principle contained in its initial legal reception: in the dissents and decisions and commentary in the 
five or so years after the decision. 
D  Early Criticisms of the Genuine Link  
Criticisms in Flegenheimer of the genuine connection test have recurred through legal 
commentary and treatment of the genuine link. In Flegenheimer,85 following a discussion of the utility 
  
80  At [49], art 7. 
81  At [50], commentary to art 7, (4). 
82  At [50], commentary to art 7, (3). In another article, Draft Article 6, the ILC also endorsed the proposition 
advanced in Mergé that any state of which a person is national is entitled to bring a claim against a state of 
which that person is not a national; in other words, there is no requirement that the claimant state be the state 
of predominant nationality in these circumstances. 
83  See the references listed above, n 60.  
84  In Parts II(B) and III(B). 
85  Introduced in Part III(A). 
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of "effective nationality" for managing relations between two states in circumstances where a person 
is a national of both, the Commission continues:86 
But when a person is vested with only one nationality… the theory of effective nationality cannot be 
applied without the risk of causing confusion. It lacks a sufficiently positive basis to be applied to a 
nationality which finds support in a state law. There does not in fact exist any criterion of proven 
effectiveness for disclosing the effectiveness of a bond with a political collectivity, and the persons by the 
thousands who, because of the facility of travel in the modern world, possess the positive legal nationality 
of a State, but live in foreign States where they are domiciled and where their family and business center 
is located, would be exposed to non-recognition, at the international level … if this doctrine were to be 
generalized. 
Here, there is a concern that the genuine link requirement will be "generalised", that is, applied 
outside the plural nationality context introduced in Part II(B) and instead used in the manner in which 
it was applied in Nottebohm, and a desire to shut down that possibility.  
The territorial orientation of "genuine link" is clear from its presentation and use in the majority 
judgment in Nottebohm. A first substantive objection contained in the quoted passage from 
Flegenheimer is the apprehension, widespread among early commentators on Nottebohm, that 
"genuine link" would be Procrustean in its operation, lopping various portions of the citizenry off 
from the population, in particular expatriates.87 The apprehension is that in its application the "genuine 
link" would denude a person who lived outside his or her state of nationality of protections integral to 
citizenship status. 
In addition to the above apprehensions about the implications of the genuine link for expatriates, 
the early legal materials raised a more general objection to the principle. The problem identified was 
the imposition of a general, universal requirement on the messy, and extensive, diversity of principles 
governing the attribution of nationality worldwide. As stated by Jones: "Whatever these criteria [used 
to give content to the genuine link] may be they must certainly result in the creation of fresh, and 
potentially large, classes of unprotected persons."88 The genuine link requirement would deprive a 
  
86  Flegenheimer, above n 54, at 150. See also Nottebohm, above n 3, at 55–56 per Judge Guggenheim dissenting. 
For quotation of the passage see for example: Weis, above n 39, at 184; and Alfred M Boll Multiple 
Nationality and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007) at 111. Compare with the 
highly critical account of both Flegenheimer (including the quoted passage) and Nottebohm provided by 
Goldschmidt, above n 43, at 707–708. 
87  See Nottebohm, above n 3, at 44 per Judge Read dissenting. See also Jones, above n 9, at 239–240.  
88  Jones, above n 9, at 244. 
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person of the protections of citizenship status when his or her connections to the state did not meet 
the prescribed content given to the standard.89  
The above quote from Flegenheimer also raises the difficulty of formulating the "effectiveness" 
of the relationship, namely "a bond with a political collectivity", as a legal criterion. To adopt the 
language of Judge Read's dissent in Nottebohm, the introduction of the genuine link requirement 
threatens to substitute a "vague and subjective test" for "objective tests, readily established, for the 
existence and recognition of the status".90 In addition to legal title to citizenship, settled by positive 
domestic law, the "genuine link" test requires that a person's factual circumstances meet an evaluative 
standard going to the strength of a person's ties and commitment to his or her country of nationality. 
The potential issues generated by a "vague and subjective test" go beyond issues of "workability", to 
the difficulties such tests pose for legal accountability and security of status.  
Another way of expressing these apprehensions about making core attributes of nationality 
dependent on a further factual inquiry has been to point out that the genuine link requirement 
destabilised and undermined citizenship status as a matter of positive law. The majority reasoning 
leaves uncertainty as to Nottebohm's legal status beyond Liechtenstein's borders. As complained by 
an early critic of the decision:91 
… the posture of his international status remains hopelessly vague. Liechtenstein proclaims him a national. 
Guatemala discounts that claim, stating that he is a German … The Federal Republic of Germany 
expressly refutes any relationship with Nottebohm … The result is that Friedrich Nottebohm's status is 
fixed and determinable only within the geographic configuration of Liechtenstein, a sovereign Principality 
having the same area as the District of Columbia. 
In denying recognition to Nottebohm's nationality for the purposes of Liechtenstein's diplomatic 
protection claim, the Court cast doubt over his nationality status more generally.92  
  
89  Criticisms of the genuine link requirement as developed and employed in Nottebohm are distinct from the 
broader question of whether international law can and/or should deny recognition on other grounds to 
citizenship validly conferred under domestic law, for example on the grounds that the domestic law is racially 
discriminatory. On the latter ground see for example Peter J Spiro "A New International Law of Citizenship" 
(2011) 105 AJIL 694 at 722.  
90  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 46 per Judge Read dissenting. For a discussion situating these issues in a 
contemporary factual context see Rishi Gulati "The relevance of nationality in the age of Google, Skype and 
Facebook" in Fiona Jenkins, Mark Nolan and Kim Rubenstein Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) 542 at 558–560. 
91  Jack H Glazer "Affaire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) – A Critique" (1956) 44 Geo LJ 313 at 322–
323. 
92  The Nottebohm majority held that denying recognition to Liechtenstein's conferral of citizenship left his 
domestic citizenship status unaffected and stated "nationality has its most immediate, its most far-reaching 
and, for most people, its only effects within the legal system of the State conferring it": Nottebohm, above n 
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Finally, there is the question of who gains in power from making a person's ability to access the 
protections of citizenship dependent on an additional factual inquiry. The factual assessment of 
whether a person's relationship to his or her state of nationality is characterised by "sincerity, fidelity, 
durability, lack of substantial connection", or whatever evaluative criteria are used to give content to 
the "genuine link" principle, is an assessment that will be carried out by state officials.93 "Vague and 
subjective tests" point to a significant increase in discretion and power for the officials charged with 
determining whether the relevant criteria are met.94 
Notwithstanding the genuine link's diminished, or at least decentred (to the plural nationality 
context), place in public international law95 and its critical reception in that discipline,96 the test 
continues to be invoked in political and theoretical discussion. Its usage in these fields both draws on 
and expands the conditional approach to nationality endorsed in Nottebohm. This usage is the subject 
of the next Part.  
IV USE OF THE "GENUINE LINK" REQUIREMENT IN 
CITIZENSHIP THEORY 
A  Shachar's Use of The Genuine Link 
The "genuine link" requirement has proved influential in citizenship theory. I analyse a prominent 
work of political theory that draws heavily on Nottebohm and the genuine link requirement, Ayelet 
Shachar's The Birthright Lottery.97 Her account makes readily apparent how the "genuine link" 
requirement can be seen to inspire a progressive and inclusionary account of citizenship. Conversely, 
it also demonstrates what one has to forget and misconstrue about Nottebohm to have the decision 
serve this purpose. Shachar's proposal is a work of normative political theory. Issues with the nature 
  
3, at 20. This attempt by the majority to downplay the transnational dimension of citizenship is incongruous 
in the circumstances of the case, as conveyed by the quote from Glazer in the text.  
93  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 46 per Judge Read dissenting. 
94  A municipal law analogy to illustrate the power conferred by "vague and subjective" conditions on citizenship 
can be found in the British deprivation power introduced in 2006 whereby a British citizen can be stripped of 
that status if the Secretary of State is "satisfied" that this is "conducive to the public good": British Nationality 
Act 1981 (UK), s 40(2). A closer analogy with the genuine link requirement, because they are still framed in 
terms of a connection between citizen and state rather than as an open-ended discretion, are Australian 
citizenship deprivation powers, introduced in December 2015, that are triggered by an Australian engaging in 
conduct "inconsistent with their allegiance" to Australia: see Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), s 
33AA(1). On the "substantive, multidimensional" concept of allegiance relied on to support the 
constitutionality of the Australian Act see Helen Irving and Rayner Thwaites "Australian Citizenship 
Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (Cth)" (2015) 26 PLR 137 at 145. 
95  As discussed in Part III(A)–(C). 
96  As discussed in Part III(D). 
97  Shachar, above n 2. 
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and operation of the criterion in law and the criticisms contained in the legal materials might not affect 
the strength of her normative argument. I argue that they do.  
The Birthright Lottery is centrally concerned with global distributive justice and the structural 
inequality that results from the allocation of citizenship by birth. Being born with Canadian 
citizenship, for example, greatly improves one's life chances and opportunities relative to being born, 
for example, a Syrian citizen. Shachar argues that we should conceptualise citizenship status as a form 
of property. Acquisition of citizenship by birth raises issues of distributive justice familiar from 
debates over inheritance of property. To address these distributive inequities, Shachar advocates a 
birthright privilege levy on those born with a favoured citizenship.  
 In the final chapter of her book Shachar proposes a reform to citizenship acquisition. The reform 
seeks to remedy problems of under- and over-inclusion in a state's distribution of membership. Under- 
and over-inclusion are judged relative to the desiderata that citizenship status should track a person's 
ties to a given state.98 "Resident stakeholders" in a state should be entitled to full membership; 
conversely, full membership should not be extended to those with only a nominal connection to the 
state.99 To achieve this objective, Shachar proposes to substitute what she calls a "jus nexi" 
requirement for those imperfect proxies for "genuine connection": citizenship by birth (jus soli) and 
by descent (jus sanguinis). In developing and elaborating this "genuine connection principle of 
membership acquisition" she draws heavily on Nottebohm. My comments on Shachar's work are 
directed not to her broader argument on the relationship between citizenship and global distributive 
injustice, but to the use she makes of her "genuine connection principle of membership 
acquisition".100 
Her jus nexi requirement is derived, in part, from her reading of the legal materials. She states:101 
In outlining the jus nexi membership criterion, I draw upon the growing acceptance of the genuine-
connection criterion in court decisions, regulatory regimes, and academic commentaries on the place of 
residence and the relevance of factual membership and actual ties to the polity. 
Shachar's claim for the criterion's "growing acceptance" in court decisions and regulatory regimes 
is overstated and in need of clarification and qualification.102 Shachar may appear to be using 
"genuine connection" loosely. There are ambiguities in her account as to: whether the genuine 
connection principle is to function as a legal criterion or as a general policy preference; whether 
  
98  At 165. 
99  At 165. 
100  At 164. 
101  At 165. 
102  See Part III. 
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"citizenship" is to be understood in the extra-legal sense of social inclusion or as a legal status; and 
whether "genuine link" would be used to create legal status or as a basis for legal entitlements. It 
remains the case that Nottebohm is central to her exposition of her jus nexi principle. She is uncritical 
of the decision. She introduces Nottebohm stating:103 
The idea of adopting a functional, genuine connection criterion for defining citizenship finds support from 
an unexpected source: the jurisprudence of international law. In the … Nottebohm decision, the [ICJ] held 
that citizenship is not merely an empty "title". 
She then quotes the passage encapsulating the genuine link requirement, quoted in the 
Introduction.104 She approves the criterion's application in Nottebohm on the basis that it led the ICJ 
to "'pierce the veil' of membership title in the search for that something else that makes citizenship 
effective at the international law level vis-à-vis another polity".105 And she returns to Nottebohm to 
"illuminat[e] … the meaning to be given to the genuine-connection conception of membership", the 
"subject matter" of her inquiry.106  
Shachar's use of the genuine link requirement differs in certain basic respects from its usage in 
Nottebohm. Shachar introduces jus nexi as a "genuine-connection principle of citizenship 
acquisition".107 Her theory is not addressed to diplomatic protection or to other consequences of 
nationality at international law, but to the principles of citizenship acquisition as a matter of municipal 
law.108 A further feature of Shachar's account is that she presents the genuine link principle as 
  
103  Shachar, above n 2, at 166.  
104  See in the text accompanying n 6 above. 
105  Shachar, above n 2, at 167. 
106  At 168. 
107  At 164.  
108  This is an application of the genuine link concept that has also been employed in political discussions of 
citizenship status: see for example Viviane Reding, Vice President of the EU Commission and EU Justice 
Commissioner "Citizenship must not be up for sale" (speech to the Plenary Session debate of the European 
Parliament on "EU citizenship for sale", 15 January 2014). In condemning the implications for EU citizenship 
of a Maltese proposal to sell Maltese citizenship (Malta being an EU member state), Reding said "Member 
States should only award citizenship to persons where there is a 'genuine link' or 'genuine connection' to the 
country in question". This was framed as a political warning as distinct from a proposal for conferral of legal 
competence: "While I am not calling for the Commission to receive legal power to determine what constitutes 
nationality or the rules granting it, the Commission nevertheless expects that Member states act in full 
awareness of the consequences of their decisions." In its political register, proceeding from the proposal's 
perceived consequences for other states, the EU Commissioner's reaction is akin to Canada introducing a visa 
requirement for travel to Canada by citizens of St Kitts and Nevis in response to concerns over that country's 
provisions for sale of citizenship: see Government of Canada "Archived – Notice – St Kitts and Nevis citizens 
now need a visa to travel to Canada" (22 November 2014) <www.canada.ca>. 
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potentially in and of itself sufficient for the grant of citizenship.109 Her jus nexi principle of 
membership allocation is effectively proposed as a substitute for the classic modes of citizenship 
acquisition: by birth (jus soli) and by descent (jus sanguinis). Shachar leaves it open as to whether jus 
nexi is a "complete alternative to jus soli and jus sanguinis or … a supplementary principle for 
membership acquisition".110 In its former guise, Shachar's proposal is akin to requiring some form of 
naturalisation process for all citizens.111 In its latter, supplementary, formulation, it is much closer to 
the current status quo in many countries in which modified forms of jus soli and jus sanguinis now 
apply.112 
An additional complication in Shachar's use of the "genuine link" is that she does not clarify what 
entitlements are held to be core attributes of citizenship, understood as a legal status. The legal 
reception and treatment of Nottebohm proceeded from the understanding that diplomatic protection 
was an integral feature of nationality, such that denying recognition to a person's nationality for the 
purpose of diplomatic protection challenged existing understandings of nationality as a legal status. 
By way of contrast, cases which require, for example, habitual residence in addition to citizenship in 
order to be eligible for a welfare benefit are analytically distinct. In such cases, the issue is that 
citizenship is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a particular benefit. Unless the particular 
benefit is held to be a core attribute of citizenship, the grant or withholding of the benefit does not 
challenge our understanding of citizenship in the way that denying recognition to Nottebohm's 
citizenship did. Shachar treats both categories of case as speaking to the "genuine connection principle 
of membership acquisition".113 
Shachar's reasons for making the genuine link principle central to her account highlight some of 
its perennial attractions. When employed as a concept of citizenship acquisition the genuine link 
requirement can serve an integrative function.114 Where a person makes his or her life in a particular 
country the jus nexi concept provides a direct basis for integration into the citizenry of the state in 
which they find themselves, should he or she wish to take up that citizenship.115 The concept promises 
  
109  If the majority in Nottebohm had applied "genuine link" in this way, it would have led to the conclusion that 
Friedrich Nottebohm was a Guatemalan national. 
110  Shachar, above n 2, at 165, 179–180 and 188. 
111  At 180–181, where the analogy with naturalisation is made explicit, and see in particular at 181, n 57. 
112  See for example the use Shachar makes of practices in the United States and Canada on restrictions on the 
transmission of citizenship status for overseas citizens: Shachar, above n 2, at 174 and 180 respectively. 
113  See for example Shachar's treatment of Case C-138/02 Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions [2005] ECR I-02703 in Shachar, above n 2, at 176. 
114  See for example at 180. 
115  Shachar makes clear that, supposing someone is eligible for a citizenship under her jus nexi principle, whether 
or not the person takes up that citizenship is a matter for him or her: Shachar, above n 2, at 179. 
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to dissolve arbitrary distinctions between those who live together, distinctions based on citizenship 
status. 
Having said that Shachar's account is integrative, it is integrative in a particular way. The 
citizenship status follows the social facts. Shachar does not consider the reverse possibility, whereby 
citizenship status is granted in anticipation of the development of "a social fact of attachment" to the 
state, the status serving as a promise of stability, so enabling such integration. 
B  The Dynamics of the Genuine Link 
The danger that corresponds to the integrative virtues of the genuine link is that the concept 
threatens to deformalise citizenship status. The central point that Shachar wants us to take from 
Nottebohm is:116  
… that instead of relying on mere formal status of affiliation, the more important criterion is to examine 
the social fact of attachment, the genuine connection of a person to the polity as a valid and relevant basis 
for citizenship allocation. 
For Shachar, the genuine link principle expresses the relationship between citizen and state to 
which citizenship status should aspire. This leads to her proposal to directly instantiate the desired 
relationship in law as a principle of citizenship acquisition. As with the Nottebohm majority, she does 
not consider the negative consequences of trying to directly instantiate the desired relationship in legal 
criteria. 
Shachar's jus nexi principle is directed at reducing arbitrariness, understood as a lack of correlation 
between a person's lived experience and commitments and the nationality that he or she holds.117 
Citizenship is an ascriptive status, ascribed to citizens by governments. The drive to align citizenship 
status with "a social fact of attachment" can be seen to support the integration of permanent residents 
into the polity. It can also be seen to support a conditional model of citizenship, according to which 
only those citizens who can satisfy the requisite "social fact of attachment" benefit from the 
  
116  At 167. Shachar situates her work as part of a more general wave of scholarship influenced by relational 
theory that champions "an actual, real, everyday and meaningful web of relations and human interaction", set 
against "static, blanket formalism": see at 167–168. One can value relational theory, while questioning the 
appropriateness of its application to the highly asymmetric power relation between citizen and state found in 
citizenship and nationality law. For an account questioning the application of relational theory to 
administrative law in these terms see Robert Leckey Contextual Subjects: Family, State, and Relational 
Theory (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2008). 
117  Shachar does not consider the possibility that the arbitrariness of birthright citizenship might be, in its own 
way, inclusionary. Certainly, moves to qualify pure jus soli in the United Kingdom, Australia and elsewhere 
have been exclusionary in intent and effect: see for example Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol Subjects, 
Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990) at 
244–246. Here, compared to Shachar, there is the possibility of citizenship first, with integration to follow. 
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protections of the status. Of the two alternatives, this second, conditional, dynamic is the one that 
more accurately characterises the Nottebohm decision.  
A conditional approach to citizenship is suggested by Shachar's emphasis on her jus nexi proposal 
as "a conception of membership that emphasizes mutual responsibility and actual ties as the basis for 
claiming access to and participation in, the community's membership boundaries and democratic 
decision-making processes".118 If mutual responsibility means that citizenship or rights integral to 
that status (centrally diplomatic protection and a person's right to enter and remain in his or her country 
of nationality) are contingent on a citizen meeting certain obligations or requirements, then it has 
considerable potential to destabilise the securities of citizenship status.119  
Shachar returns to Nottebohm to "illuminate the meaning to be given to the genuine connection 
conception of membership".120 Problems with the content Nottebohm gave to the "genuine link" 
requirement, outlined in the discussion of early authorities and commentary on Nottebohm in Part III, 
are replicated in Shachar's jus nexi proposal. These include: "a crucial role" for "prolonged 
residence";121 a lack of guidance as to what constitutes a "genuine connection" in the absence of that 
territorial connection;122 and in part as a result of these first two features, a decidedly awkward fit 
between the genuine connection test and multiple citizenship.123  
Rejecting Shachar's jus nexi or other principles derived from the "genuine link" does not preclude 
citizenship law reform in an inclusionary direction. The criterion's use as a legal condition can be 
contrasted with "a social fact of attachment" informing policy on citizenship status. A general 
residency requirement for naturalisation,124 or limits on the intergenerational transmission of 
  
118  Ayelet Shachar "The Future of National Citizenship: Going, going, gone?" (2009) 59 UTLJ 579 at 586, n 11. 
See also Shachar's emphasis on the "implied notion of reciprocity and joint responsibility that informs the 
reliance on a genuine link test for distributing membership": Shachar, above n 2, at 184. 
119  For a critical response to the view that rights should be "paired" or "balanced" with responsibilities, framed 
as a response to Rights and Responsibilities: Developing our Constitutional Framework (United Kingdom 
Ministry of Justice, Green Paper, March 2009), see Pavlos Eleftheriadis "On rights and responsibilities" 
[2010] PL 33. 
120  Shachar, above n 2 at 168. 
121  At 178. 
122  Shachar disclaims making territorial presence "the all or nothing criterion": at 179. Her positive account of 
what criteria might supplement, or possibly substitute for, territorial presence is limited, relying on the "centre 
of interests" test from Nottebohm, quoted in the text accompanying n 52 above. 
123  In a short paragraph Shachar does affirm multiple citizenship: at 179. In this passage Shachar appears to 
reference the distinct use made of Nottebohm in the plural nationality context, discussed in the text above in 
Part III(B). She does not directly address the evident hostility of the genuine connection test, as elaborated 
and employed in Nottebohm itself, to multiple citizenship. 
124  Provided this is not treated as an inflexible requirement without exceptions. 
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citizenship with respect to citizens who have relocated to another country both implement a policy 
preference that citizenship should, to some degree, correlate with a citizen being a "resident 
stakeholder". Legislative provisions implementing these policies can avoid the problems that are 
raised by the genuine link requirement. They need not invite the prospect that a person's citizenship 
status will be impugned on the grounds that his or her citizenship is not "genuine", or that a person's 
entitlement to exercise the core attributes or protections of citizenship status will depend on an 
assessment of whether a person has a "genuine link" to the polity.  
V  CONCLUSION 
On the plane of international law, recognition of citizenship validly acquired under municipal law 
and of the core attributes of that status should not depend on a finding of "genuine link". As outlined 
in Part III, this is already the position under international law. International law has distanced itself 
from the general link doctrine employed in Nottebohm.125 The criticisms of the principle contained 
in the legal materials are manifold:126 the territorial orientation of the test threatened the legal 
protections of expatriates and the institution of multiple nationality; the use of an evaluative test 
undermines legal certainty and so legal protections; the more content that is given to the test, the more 
people will be left unprotected; and a requirement that a person's relationship to the polity is one of 
"sincerity, fidelity, durability … [or] substantial connection"127 enhances the power of the officials 
charged with determining if the requirement is met. The common thread is that conditioning 
citizenship status or its core attributes on substantive connections, deformalising it, makes it less stable 
and more vulnerable, and its protections more precarious. 
The genuine link principle gives expression to a powerful idea, that the protections that attend a 
person's nationality status are predicated on a "social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments" to the relevant state. In introducing this principle, Nottebohm 
introduced a "restrictive innovation" that arguably did an injustice to the litigant in that case. A return 
to Nottebohm and its legacy focuses attention on the dissonance between hopes that citizenship status 
will correlate with an underlying social solidarity, for which the genuine link has served as an 
inspiration, and issues generated by attempting to instantiate those ideals in law as a legal criterion. 
  
125  See Parts III(A)–(C). 
126  See Part III(D). 
127  Nottebohm, above n 3, at 46 per Judge Read dissenting. 
